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Abstract
In economics duopoly is a market dominated by two firms large enough
to influence the market price. Stackelberg presented a dynamic form of
duopoly that is also called ‘leader-follower’ model. We give a quantum
perspective on Stackelberg duopoly that gives a backwards-induction out-
come same as the Nash equilibrium in static form of duopoly also known
as Cournot’s duopoly. We find two qubit quantum pure states required
for this purpose.
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1 Introduction
Quantum game theory started from a seminal paper by Meyer [1]. Later Eisert
et. al. [2] studied the important bimatrix game of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
while focussing on the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) from noncooperative
game theory. This concept attracted much attention in other recent works in
quantum game theory [2, 3, 4, 5]. In fact Cournot (1838) [6] anticipated Nash’s
definition of equilibrium by over a century but only in the context of a particular
model of duopoly. In economics, an oligopoly is a form of market in which a
number n of producers, say, n ≥ 2, and no others, provide the market with
a certain commodity. In the special case where n = 2, it is called a duopoly.
Cournot’s work [6] is one of the classics of game theory and also a cornerstone of
the theory of industrial organization [8]. In Cournot model of duopoly two-firms
simultaneously put certain quantities of a homogeneous product in the market.
Cournot obtained an equilibrium value for the quantities both firms will decide
to put in the market. This equilibrium value was based on a rule of behavior
which says that if all the players except one abide by it, the remaining player
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cannot do better than to abide by it too. Nash gave a general concept of an
equilibrium point in a noncooperative game but existence of an equilibrium in
duopoly game was known much earlier. The “Cournot equilibrium” refers to
NE in noncooperative form of duopoly that Cournot considered.
In an interesting later development Stackelberg (1934) [9, 7] proposed a
dynamic model of duopoly in which, contrary to Cournot’s assumption of si-
multaneous moves, a leader (or dominant) firm moves first and a follower (or
subordinate) firm moves second. A well known example is the General Motors
playing this leadership role in the early history of U.S. automobile industry
when more than one firms like Ford and Chrysler acted as followers. In this
sequential game a “Stackelberg equilibrium” is obtained using the backwards-
induction outcome of the game. In fact Stackelberg equilibrium refers to the
sequential-move nature of the game and this is a stronger solution concept than
NE because sequential move games sometimes have multiple NE , only one of
which is associated with the backwards-induction outcome of the game [7].
The seminal paper by Meyer [1] has initiated the new field of quantum games
and has motivated many people to look at games from quantum perspectives.
Eisert et. al. [2] quantized the famous bimatrix game of Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) and showed that dilemma disappears in quantum world. They allowed
players an access to a maximally entangled state that can be generated from
a system of two qubits. Each player then unitarily manipulates a qubit in his
possession. Players apply a unitary operator from a particular subset of the
general set of unitary operators that also forms a group. Benjamin [10] later
showed that if the players have access to the set of general unitary operators
then there is no NE in pure strategies in the PD game. Benjamin implied that
Eisert’s set of unitary operators was carefully chosen to generate a NE that has
no classical counterpart.
Eisert et. al. [2] used an unentangling gate in their scheme to be put before
the quantum state is forwarded to measuring apparatus that collapses the wave
function and gives the payoffs. The unentangling gate in Eisert’s scheme ensured
that classical game could be reproducible but it motivated Marinatto [13] to
question the necessity of its presence in the scheme to play a quantum game.
Marinatto andWeber [3] came up with a solution where an initial quantum state,
they called it an “initial strategy”, is made available to the players. This initial
strategy is then unitarily manipulated by the players in the “tactics” phase of
the game that consisted of applying two unitary and Hermitian operators (the
identity and an inversion operator) with classical probabilities on the initial
quantum strategy. This inversion operator reverts the quantum state just like
the Pauli’s spin flip operator does [11]. Marinatto and Weber [3] showed that for
an initial strategy that is a maximally entangled state a unique NE for the game
of Battle of Sexes can be obtained. Later in an interesting comment Benjamin
[11] considered the players’ access to apply only two unitary and Hermitian
operators with classical probabilities on a quantum state a severe restriction on
all quantum mechanically possible manipulations. Marinatto and Weber replied
[14] that the only restriction on a quantum form of a game is that corresponding
classical game must be reproducible as a special case of the quantum form.
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Agreeing with this reply we studied the concept of evolutionary stability in
asymmetric as well as symmetric quantum games [16, 17]. Our prime motivation
was an important and interesting element in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. It
was the fact that a switch-over between a classical and a non-classical form
of a game could be achieved by having a control over the parameters of the
initial quantum state or initial strategy. In the scheme of Eisert, Wilkens, and
Lewenstein [2] such a switch-over takes place when the players assign specific
values to the parameters of the unitary operators in their possession; while
the initial two-qubit quantum state always remains to be maximally entangled.
Starting a quantum game from a general pure state of two qubits that have
interacted previously we were able to show the possibility that an unstable
symmetric NE of a bimatrix classical game becomes stable in a quantum form of
the same game [18]. Our assumption in this approach was that a replacement of
the maximally entangled two qubit quantum state, that Marinatto and Weber
used to get a unique NE, with a general two qubit pure quantum state also
results in another form of the same game. This assumption led us to find
the conditions on the constants of a general three qubit pure state that made
it possible to counter against coalition formation in a three player symmetric
game [19]. The person responsible for preparing quantum states can thus make
vanish the motivation to make a coalition in the cooperative game.
Motivated by these recent developments in quantum games as well as the
notion of backwards-induction outcome of a dynamic game of complete infor-
mation [7] we present a quantum perspective on the interesting game of Stack-
elberg duopoly. In present paper we start with the same assumption that a
game is decided only by players’ unitary manipulations, payoff operators, and
the measuring apparatus deciding payoffs. When these are same a different in-
put quantum initial state gives only a different form of the same game. This
was our assumption when we studied evolutionary stability of a mixed NE in
Rock-Scissors-Paper game [18]. Therefore all the games that can be obtained
by using a general two qubit pure state are only different forms of the same
game if the rest of the procedures in playing the quantum game are same. For
example in Marinatto and Weber’s Battle of Sexes [3] the game remains Battle
of Sexes for all two qubit pure quantum states.
With this assumption we start an analysis of Stackelberg duopoly by asking a
fundamental question: Is it possible to find a two qubit pure quantum state that
generates the classical Cournot equilibrium as a backwards-induction outcome
of the quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly? Why this question can be of
interest? For us it is interesting because in case the answer is yes then the very
important resource in quantum game theory i.e. entanglement can potentially
be a particularly useful element for ‘follower’ in the leader-follower model of
Stackelberg duopoly [7]. This is because in classical settings when static duopoly
changes itself into a dynamic form the follower becomes worse-off compared to
leader who becomes better-off. We find that under certain restrictions it is
possible to find the needed two qubit quantum states. Therefore a quantum
form of a dynamic game of complete information gives out an equilibrium that
corresponds to classical static form of the same game. In our analysis the
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equilibrium can be obtained for a certain range of the constant of the duopoly
game. This restriction appears only due to an assumption that we introduce
to simplify calculations. This fact, however, does not rule out the possibility of
getting a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly game with no such restriction.
2 Backwards-induction outcome
To make this paper self-contained we give an introduction of the backwards-
induction outcome of a sequential game. For this we find very useful the ref.
[7]. Consider a simple three step game
1. Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the feasible set A1
2. Player 2 observes a1 and then chooses an action a2 from the feasible set
A2
3. Payoffs are u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2)
This game is an example of the dynamic games of complete and perfect
information. Key features of such games are
1. the moves occur in sequence
2. all previous moves are known before next move is chosen, and
3. the players’ payoffs are common knowledge. At the second stage of the
game when player 2 gets the move he or she faces the following problem,
given the action a1previously chosen by the player
Max
a2∈A2
u2(a1, a2) (1)
Assume that for each a1 in A1, player 2’s optimization problem has a unique
solution R2(a1) also called the best response of player 2. Now player 1 can also
solve player 2’s optimization problem by anticipating player 2’s response to each
action a1 that player 1 might take. So that player 1 faces the following problem
Max
a1∈A1
u1(a1, R2(a1)) (2)
Suppose this optimization problem also has a unique solution for player 1 and is
denoted by a⋆1. The solution (a
⋆
1, R2(a
⋆
1)) is the backwards-induction outcome of
this game. In a simple version of the Cournot’s model two firms simultaneously
decide the quantities q1 and q2 respectively of a homogeneous product they want
to put into the market. Suppose Q is the aggregate quantity i.e. Q = q1 + q2
and P (Q) = a−Q be the market-clearing price, the price at which all products
or services available in a market will find buyers. Assume the total cost to a
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firm producing quantity qi is cqi i.e. there are no fixed costs and the marginal
cost is a constant c with c < a. In a two-player game theoretical model of this
situation a firm’s payoff or profit can be written as [7]
Pi(qi, qj) = qi [P (Q)− c] = qi [a− c− (qi + qj)] = qi [k − (qi + qj)] (3)
Solving for the NE easily gives the Cournot equilibrium
q⋆1 = q
⋆
2 =
k
3
(4)
At this equilibrium the payoffs to both firms from eq. (3) are
P1(q
⋆
1 , q
⋆
2)Cournot = P2(q
⋆
1 , q
⋆
2)Cournot =
k2
9
(5)
We now come to consider the classical form of duopoly game when it becomes
dynamic. The game becomes dynamic but the payoffs to players are given by
the same eq. (3) as for the case of the Cournot’s game. We find backwards-
induction outcome in classical and a quantum form of Stackelberg’s duopoly.
Taking advantage from bigger picture given to this dynamic game by Hilbert
space structure we then find two qubit pure quantum states that give classi-
cal Cournot’s equilibrium as the backwards-induction outcome of the quantum
game of Stackelberg’s duopoly.
3 Stackelberg duopoly
3.1 Classical form
A leader (or dominant) firm moves first and a follower (or subordinate) firm
moves second in Stackelberg model of duopoly [7]. The sequence of events is
1. firm A chooses a quantity q1 ≥ 0
2. firm B observes q1 and then chooses a quantity q2 ≥ 0
3. the payoffs to firms A and B are given by their respective profit functions
as
PA(q1, q2) = q1 [k − (q1 + q2)]
PB(q1, q2) = q2 [k − (q1 + q2)] (6)
The backwards-induction outcome is found by first finding firm B’s reaction to
an arbitrary quantity by firm A. Denoting this quantity as R2(q1) we find
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R2(q1) =Max
q2≥0
PB(q1, q2) =
k − q1
2
(7)
with q1 < k. Now the interesting aspect of this game is that firm A can solve
the firm B’s problem as well. Therefore firm A can anticipate that a choice of
the quantity q1 will meet a reaction R2(q1). In the first stage of the game firm
A can then compute a solution to his/her optimization problem as
Max
q1≥0
PA [q1, R2(q1)] =Max
q1≥0
q1(k − q1)
2
It gives
q⋆1 =
k
2
and R2(q
⋆
1) =
k
4
(8)
It is the classical backwards-induction outcome of dynamic form of the duopoly
game. At this equilibrium payoffs or profits to players A and B are given by
eqs. (6) and (8)
PA [q
⋆
1 , R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg =
k2
8
, PB [q
⋆
1 , R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg =
k2
16
(9)
From eq. (9) find the following ratio
PA [q
⋆
1 , R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg
PB [q⋆1 , R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg
= 2 (10)
showing that with comparison to Cournot game in Stackelberg game the leader
firm becomes better-off and the follower firm becomes worse-off. This aspect also
hints an important difference between single and multi-person decision prob-
lems. In single-person decision theory having more information can never make
the decision maker worse-off. In game theory, however, having more information
(or, more precisely, having it made public that one has more information) can
make a player worse-off [7].
Now we look at backwards-induction outcome in a quantum perspective. Our
motivation is an interesting aspect that quantum form can bring into backwards-
induction outcome. It is the possibility that the ‘extra information’ that firm
B has does not make firm B worse-off.
3.2 Quantum form
Stackelberg duopoly is a two player sequential game. Meyer [1] considered quan-
tum form of sequential game of PQ Penny Flip by unitary operations on single
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qubit. Important difference between Meyer’s PQ Penny Flip and Stackelberg
duopoly is that at the second stage player in PQ Penny Flip doesn’t know the
previous move but in Stackelberg duopoly he knows that.
Marinatto and Weber [3] used two qubits to play the noncooperative game
of Battle of Sexes. Players apply unitary operators I and C with classical
probabilities on a two-qubit pure quantum state. I is identity and C is inversion
or Pauli’s spin-flip operator. We prefer this scheme to play the sequential game
of Stackelberg duopoly for two reasons:
1. Interesting feature in this scheme that classical game is reproducible on
making initial state unentangled.
2. We assumed that other games obtained from every pure two qubit ini-
tial state are only quantum forms of the classical game provided players’
actions and payoff generating measurement are exactly same [18]. This
assumption reduces the problem of finding a quantum form of Stackel-
berg duopoly with property that its equilibrium is same as in Cournot’s
duopoly to the problem of finding conditions on parameters of two-qubit
pure quantum state. If the conditions are realistic then the corresponding
quantum game will give Cournot’s equilibrium as a backwards-induction
outcome.
Fig. 1. Playing a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly.
Stackelberg duopoly is a dynamic game of complete information. Its quan-
tum form in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [3] starts by preparing a pure two-
qubit initial quantum state. Both these qubits are then forwarded to two players
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in the game called Alice and Bob. Marinatto and Weber expanded on the ear-
lier scheme proposed by Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein [2] using a two-qubit
system in a maximally entangled quantum state. The fundamental idea remains
the same i.e. to exploit entanglement to get new results for a simultaneous-move
game. Suppose first move is to be played by Alice and she plays her strategy
by applying two operators in her possession on her qubit with classical proba-
bilities. She also announces her move immediately so that Bob knows Alice’s
strategy before playing his move. Bob plays his strategy on his qubit and both
Alice and Bob forward their qubits to a setup where measurement can be done
to decide payoffs to both.
The concept of information about the previous moves is crucial for the un-
derstanding of the present paper. A comparison between the sequential game of
Stackelberg duopoly with the simultaneous moves of the Battle of Sexes makes
clear the different information structure between the two games. For example
in the Battle of Sexes, when played sequentially, Alice does not announce her
first move to Bob before he makes his move. In this way the game becomes
sequential but the information structure of the game is still the same as in its
static form. Consequently, the sequential Battle of Sexes in the above form has
the same NE as in its static form. An unobserved-action form of a game has
the same NE as its simultaneous-move form. This observation led us to play a
quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly while keeping intact the original struc-
ture of a scheme designed for simultaneous moves. A consideration of playing a
sequential game in a quantum way brings to mind the Meyer’s PQ Penny Flip
[1] where only one qubit is used in the game. Contrary to this, in present paper
we use the two-qubit system of a simultaneous moves game to play a sequential
game.
One can ask what is the point of taking extra pains by using two qubits when
a quantum form of this sequential game can also be played by only one qubit
in similar way as Meyer’s PQ Penny Flip. We prefer two qubits for a reason
that appeared to us quite important. In two-qubit case a comparison between
classical and a quantum form of the game translates itself into comparing two
games resulting from using unentangled and entangled initial quantum states.
We do not rule out the possibility that a consideration of the dynamic game
using only single qubit gives equally or even more interesting results.
The quantum form of Marinatto and Weber’s [3] Battle of Sexes game re-
duces to its classical form for the initial state |ψini〉 = |OO〉 where O represents
the pure classical strategy called ‘Opera’. In the same spirit we let classical
payoffs in Stackelberg duopoly given by eq. (6) reproduced when the initial
state |ψini〉 = |11〉 is used to play the game. The state |11〉 means that both
qubits are in lower state. We represent the upper state of a qubit by number 2.
For |ψini〉 = |11〉 the corresponding density matrix is
ρini = |11〉 〈11| (11)
When players apply the unitary operators I and C such that Alice and Bob
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apply I with probabilities x and y respectively the density matrix (11) changes
to [3]
ρfin = xyIA ⊗ IBρiniI
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + x(1− y)IA ⊗ CBρiniI
†
A ⊗ C
†
B +
y(1− x)CA ⊗ IBρiniC
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + (1− x)(1 − y)CA ⊗ CBρiniC
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
(12)
where the inversion operator C interchanges the vectors |1〉 and |2〉 i.e. C |1〉 =
|2〉 , C |2〉 = |1〉 and C† = C = C−1. We now assume that in Stackelberg
duopoly also players’ moves are again given by probabilities lying in the range
[0, 1]. The moves by Alice and Bob in classical duopoly game are given by
quantities q1 and q2 where q1, q2 ∈ [0,∞). We assume that Alice and Bob agree
on a function that can uniquely define a real positive number in the range (0, 1]
for every quantity q1, q2 in [0,∞). A simple such function is
1
1+qi
, so that Alice
and Bob find x and y respectively as
x =
1
1 + q1
, y =
1
1 + q2
(13)
and use these real numbers as probabilities with which they apply the identity
operator I on the quantum state at their disposal. With a substitution from
eqs. (11,13) the final density matrix (12) can be written as
ρfin =
1
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
[|11〉 〈11|+ q1q2 |22〉 〈22|+ q1 |21〉 〈21|+ q2 |12〉 〈12|]
(14)
We now also suppose that in the measurement and payoffs finding phase the
quantities q1 and q2 are known to the ‘agent’ doing this action. The agent
applies the payoff operators (PA)oper, (PB)oper given as follows
(PA)oper = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)q1 [k |11〉 〈11| − |21〉 〈21| − |12〉 〈12|]
(PB)oper = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)q2 [k |11〉 〈11| − |21〉 〈21| − |12〉 〈12|] (15)
Note that the classical payoffs of eq. (6) are reproduced with the initial state
|ψini〉 = |11〉 with the following trace operations
PA(q1, q2) = Trace [(PA)operρfin]
PB(q1, q2) = Trace [(PB)operρfin] (16)
A more general form of quantum duopoly can now be played by keeping the
payoff operators of eq. (15) in the agent’s possession and preparing a general
initial pure state of the following form
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|ψini〉 = c11 |11〉+ c12 |12〉+ c21 |21〉+ c22 |22〉 (17)
where |c11|
2
+ |c12|
2
+ |c21|
2
+ |c22|
2
= 1 (18)
where cij ,for i, j = 1 or 2, are complex numbers and |ij〉 are orthonormal basis
vectors in 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space. The payoffs to Alice and Bob can
now be obtained in this more general quantum game from eqs. (16) that use
the same payoff operators of eqs. (15). The payoffs to Alice and Bob can now
be written as [20]
[PA(q1, q2)]qtm =
(ω11 + ω12q2) + q1(ω21 + ω22q2)
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
[PB(q1, q2)]qtm =
(χ11 + χ12q2) + q1(χ21 + χ22q2)
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
(19)
where the subscript qtm is for ‘quantum’ and


ω11
ω12
ω21
ω22

 =


|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2




kq1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
0




χ11
χ12
χ21
χ22

 =


|c11|
2 |c12|
2 |c21|
2 |c22|
2
|c12|
2 |c11|
2 |c22|
2 |c21|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2




kq2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
0


(20)
The classical payoffs of duopoly game given in eqs. (6) are recovered from the
eqs. (19) when the initial quantum state becomes unentangled and given by
|ψini〉 = |11〉. Classical duopoly is, therefore, a subset of its quantum version.
We now find the backwards-induction outcome in this quantum form of
Stackelberg duopoly. We proceed in exactly the same way as it is done in the
classical game except that players’ payoffs are now given by eqs. (19) and not by
eqs. (6). The first step in backwards-induction in quantum game is to find Bob’s
reaction to an arbitrary quantity q1 chosen by Alice. Denoting this quantity as
[R2(q1)]qtm we find
[R2(q1)]qtm =Max
q2≥0
[PB(q1, q2)]qtm =
q1△1 +△2
−2 {q1△3 +△4}
where
|c11|
2
+ |c22|
2
− k |c21|
2
= △1, |c12|
2
+ |c21|
2
− k |c11|
2
= △2
|c12|
2 + |c21|
2 − k |c22|
2 = △3, |c11|
2 + |c22|
2 − k |c12|
2 = △4 (21)
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This reaction reduces to its classical value of eq. (7) when |c11|
2
= 1. Similar to
classical game Alice can now solve Bob’s problem as well. Therefore Alice can
anticipate that a choice of the quantity q1 will meet a reaction [R2(q1)]qtm. In
the first stage of the game like its classical version Alice can compute a solution
to her optimization problem as
Max
q1≥0
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
(22)
To find it Alice calculates the following quantity
d [PA(q1, q2)]qtm
dq1
=
(|c11|
2
+ |c22|
2
− |c12|
2
− |c21|
2
)
(1 + q1)
{
−2q21 + q1(k − 2) + k
}
+ (1 + 2q1)
{
(k − 1) |c21|
2
− |c12|
2
}
+ k(|c12|
2
− |c22|
2
)
− q1
dq2
dq1
{△4 + q1△3} − q2 {2q1△3 +△4}
(23)
and replaces q2 in eq. (23) with [R2(q1)]qtm given by eq. (21) and then equates
eq. (23) to zero to find a q⋆1 that maximizes her payoff [PA(q1, q2)]qtm. For a
maxima she would ensure that the second derivative of PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}
with respect to q1 at q1 = q
⋆
1 is a negative quantity. The q
⋆
1 together with
[R2(q
⋆
1)]qtm will form the backwards-induction outcome of the quantum game.
An interesting situation is when the backwards-induction outcome in quan-
tum version of Stackelberg duopoly becomes same as the classical Cournot
equilibrium of duopoly. The classical situation of leader becoming better-off
while the follower becoming worse-off is then avoided in the quantum form of
Stackelberg duopoly. To look for this possibility we need such an initial state
|ψini〉 = c11 |11〉+c12 |12〉+c21 |21〉+c22 |22〉 that at q
⋆
1 = q
⋆
2 =
k
3
we should have
following relations holding true also with the normalization condition given in
eq. (18)
d
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
dq1
|q1=q⋆1= 0 (24)

d2
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
dq21
|q1=q⋆1

 < 0 (25)
q⋆2 = {R2(q
⋆
1)}qtm (26)
The conditions (24,25) simply say that the backwards-induction outcome of
the quantum game is the same as Cournot equilibrium in classical game. The
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condition (26) says that Bob’s reaction to Alice’s choice of q⋆1 =
k
3
is q⋆2 =
k
3
.
To show that such quantum states can exist for which the conditions (24,25,26)
with the normalization (18) hold true we give an example where |c11|
2
, |c12|
2
and |c21|
2
are written as functions of k with our assumption that |c22|
2
= 0.
Though this assumption puts its own restriction on the possible range of k for
which the above conditions hold for these functions but still it shows clearly
the possibility of finding the required initial quantum states. The functions are
found as
|c12(k)|
2
=
−f(k) +
√
f(k)2 − 4g(k)h(k)
2g(k)
where
f(k) = j(k)
{
−7
18
k2 +
1
3
k +
1
2
}
+
{
k2
9
+
k
3
+
1
2
}
g(k) = j(k)2
{
−1
9
k3 +
7
18
k2 −
1
2
}
+ j(k)
{
2
9
k3 +
5
18
k2 −
1
2
k − 1
}
+
{
−1
9
k2 −
1
2
k −
1
2
}
h(k) =
−1
6
k, j(k) =
9− 4k2
k2 − 9
also
|c21(k)|
2 = j(k) |c12(k)|
2 (27)
|c11(k)|
2
= 1− |c12(k)|
2
− |c21(k)|
2
(28)
Now, interestingly, given that allowed range of k is 1.5 ≤ k ≤ 1.73205, all of the
conditions (18,24,25,26) hold at q⋆1 = q
⋆
2 =
k
3
. So that in this range of k a quan-
tum form of Stackelberg duopoly exists that gives the classical Cournot equilib-
rium as backwards-induction outcome. The restriction on allowed range of k is
result of our assumption that |c22(k)|
2
= 0. In fig.2 below |c11(k)|
2
, |c12(k)|
2
and
|c21(k)|
2
are plotted against k in the above range.
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Fig. 2. |c11(k)|
2
, |c12(k)|
2& |c21(k)|
2against k when |c22|
2 = 0
4 Discussion and Conclusion
What can possibly be a relevance of considering a quantum form of a game that
models a competition between two firms in macroscopic world of economics?
Quantum mechanics was developed to understand phenomena in the regime
of atomic and subatomic interactions and is still mostly used in that domain.
What is of interest in extending a game theoretical model of interaction between
firms towards quantum domain? These questions naturally arise not only with
reference to Stackelberg duopoly considered in this paper but also other related
works in quantum games. Apart from exciting new directions that quantum me-
chanics brings to game theory there is also a fundamental interest in quantum
games from the view of quantum information theory. The fact that quantum al-
gorithms may be thought of as games between classical and quantum agents was
pointed out by Meyer [1]. Meyer indicated a strong motivation for the study
of quantum games by considering zero-sum quantum games in order to have
a new starting point at hand to find quantum algorithms that outperform its
classical analogue. Many quantum information exchange protocols have been
modelled like games. Eavesdropping and optimal cloning are two such often
cited examples where objective before a player is to gain as much information
as possible. We believe that like other notions of game theory finding some
relevance in quantum information a consideration of backwards-induction can
be of interest for exactly the same reasons. It does not seem hard to imagine
situations in quantum information where moves occur in sequence, all previous
moves are observed before the next move is chosen, players’ payoffs from each
feasible combination of moves are common knowledge. Interesting questions
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then arise about how a quantum version of dynamic game of complete infor-
mation can influence the outcome. Our primary motivation, however, to study
backwards-induction in quantum games is from the view of dynamic stability,
especially of symmetric NE, that has important relevance in evolutionary games
[15] that we found interesting in quantum settings [16, 17, 18, 20].
The duopoly game models economic competition between firms and applied
economics is the area where it is studied in detail. We considered this game in a
scheme that tells how to play a quantum game and gives a Hilbert structure to
the strategy space to which players have access to. The fact that quantum game
theory can give entirely new views on games important in economics is apparent
in recent interesting papers by Piotrowski and Sladkowski [21, 22] proposing a
quantum-like description of markets and economies where players’ strategies
belong to Hilbert space. It shows that quantum games certainly have features
of interest to applied economists. Reciprocating with it we showed that games
played by firms in economic competition can give counter-intuitive solutions
when played in a quantum world.
We conclude our results as follows. A comparison between the NE in Cournot
game with backwards-induction outcome in classical Stackelberg duopoly shows
that having Alice (or firm A who acts first) know that Bob (or firm B who
acts second) knows q1 (Alice’s move) hurts Bob. In fact in classical Stackelberg
game Bob should not believe that Alice has chosen its Stackelberg quantity i.e.
q⋆1 =
k
2
. We have shown that there can be a quantum version of Stackelberg
duopoly where Bob is not hurt even if he knows the quantity q1 chosen by Alice.
The backwards-induction outcome of this quantum game is the same as the NE
in classical Cournot game where decisions are made simultaneously and there
is no such information that hurts a player. Though this outcome in quantum
game is obtained for a restricted range of the variable k but it is only because
of a simplification in calculations.
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